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Background
In recent years, civilian capacity and its role in supporting sus-
tainable peace and nation building in post-conflict countries have 
received increasing attention from members of the international 
community. Following the recommendations and principles out-
lined in the 2011 Guehenno Report, concrete steps have been taken 
by member states and organizations to improve support for national 
capacity development in post-conflict countries. This policy paper 
aims to highlight the current status of civilian capacity efforts in 
regional organizations as well as in the United Nations, and policies 
that may affect civilian capacity in the future.
I. The Current Status of Civilian Capacities: United Nations 
and Regional Organizations: The African Union
The United Nations civilian capacity agenda sought to create better 
linkages to support security and development approaches, including 
the paradox of providing short-term support in long-term peace-
building processes. The UN is currently managing 17 peacekeeping 
operations and 11 political and peacebuilding missions around the 
world. Combined, these operations utilize over 6,300 international 
civilian personnel and 13,912 local personnel.1 Operations range 
from stabilization missions in Haiti to peacekeeping operations in 
South Sudan. The demand for civilian personnel on such missions 
has remained consistent over the core peacebuilding areas of security 
and political institutions, the rule of law, and core government func-
tionality. However, the area of economic revitalization has been one 
of the least successful sectors of civilian capacity. 
The final report by the UN Secretary-General (January 2014) on the 
civilian capacity initiative signals a new form of UN engagement com-
pared to the frenzied activism of the preceding years. Emphasizing a 
more reflective approach, the report outlines the UN’s focus on les-
sons learned and on mainstreaming existing institutional structures 
and mechanisms while expanding partnerships with member states 
and regional organizations and financial institutions.2 This marks 
a shift in the process of conceptualizing and developing civilian 
capacity that has been ongoing since 2010. This is accompanied by a 
renewed focus on recruiting civilian expertise for institution-building 
while increasing the presence of women in peacebuilding operations. 
In addition, enhancing partnerships through regional, South–South 
and triangular cooperation are being explored. The Secretary-General 
has stated that member states will need to provide more technical 
and financial resources to increase UN outreach to the Global South. 
 
The Role of Regional Organizations
From Ukraine to the Central African Republic, recent conflicts have 
signaled an increased engagement from regional organizations, facili-
tated somewhat by new actors, or emerging powers in their spheres 
of influence. What is particularly interesting is that regional organi-
zations function outside the traditional parameters of peacebuilding 
and do not restrict their efforts to robust peacekeeping practices. In 
fact, at several international summits that followed the eruption of 
the aforementioned crises, senior representatives from numerous re-
gional organizations emphasized the value of civilian capacity, and 
declared their organizations’ intention to provide such support. 
Since 2012, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Af-
rican Union and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) appear the most committed to providing civilian capac-
ity assistance in the following key areas: access to justice, conflict 
resolution and reconciliation, support to policy and law develop-
ment, strengthening the rule of law, support to income generating 
activities, creation of economic opportunities, protection of minority 
rights, provisions of infrastructures and services, increasing citizens’ 
security, court and judicial system infrastructures. These are also the 
areas that present the most formidable challenges to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Notwithstanding these challenges, significant progress has been made 
in all of these areas with the involvement of international and regional 
organizations. The MDG Achievement Fund’s 2013 report, Conflict Pre-
vention and Peace Building, notes that 122,906 citizens, 10,568 civil 
servants, 4,171 community leaders, 2,799 policemen, and more than 
400 judges and government representatives have been trained and re-
ceived direct civilian capacity assistance in conflict-affected countries 
from Afghanistan to Colombia and Ghana to Indonesia.3 
African Union
The African Union has deployed numerous civilian capacity initia-
tives in the last few years in order to address the high demand from 
post-conflict countries on the continent. These include the African 
Civilian Capacity (AFCAP),4 a platform for disseminating information 
on training and deployment, and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), focusing on socioeconomic development. 
However, the three areas that the African Union has concentrated on 
concern the African Standby Force (ASF), the African Solidarity Initia-
tive (ASI) and the African Union Civilian Standby Roster.  
3 Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Thematic window development results 
report – 2013, Development Results Series, MDG Achievement Fund, 2013.
4 AFCAP is an outcome of deliberations of the Recruitment & Deployment Work-
shop co-organized by AFDEM and ZIF and held in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, in 
September 2010.
2Policy Brief
5  Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, Article 13.
6 A seminar held by CCCPA and CMC Finland in October 2014 , attended by rep-
resentatives from the AU, RECs and European Union, tackled this specific issue. 
One of the main recommendations was to appoint, as soon as possible, a civil-
ian roster officer for the NARC region.
Role of civilian capacities in ASF: Since the early stages of its concep-
tion, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) recognized 
the importance of civilian capacities. The first ordinary session of the 
Assembly of the African Union (Durban, July 2002) adopted the protocol 
relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, in which it was stated clearly in Article 13 that the ASF 
shall be constituted of “standby multidisciplinary contingents, with 
civilian and military components.”5 In addition to functions directed by 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC), mandates regarding peacebuild-
ing, observation and monitoring could also be given to the ASF.
 
African Solidarity Initiative: Launched in July 2012, the African Solidar-
ity Initiative (ASI) is currently the main framework through which the 
African Union is tackling the demand for civilian capacities in post-con-
flict reconstruction. The initiative, which builds upon the African Union 
Policy on Post-Conflict and Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), 
aims to provide post-conflict countries with capacities and best prac-
tices to enable a successful transition. The key priority areas identified 
for PCRD countries were as follows: security sector; national reconcilia-
tion; peacebuilding, maintenance and consolidation; agriculture; infra-
structure and energy, humanitarian issues and livelihoods; governance 
and rule of law; judicial reform; social and educational sectors; youth 
development; gender agenda and women; private-sector rehabilitation; 
macro-economic; and capacity building and development. 
The African Union Civilian Standby Roster: Since 2010, the AU 
has worked with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and 
Regional Mechanisms (RMs) on the establishment of an AU Civilian 
Standby Force. A joint work plan has been developed for the Standby 
Force, including the recruitment of roster focal points; activities 
related to training, mentoring and E-learning, roll-out and testing of 
the roster database; and finalization of the human resources policy 
framework. The African Union Commission (AUC) holds that each 
REC should adopt its own policies, as long as it is coherent with the 
overall guidelines developed at the commission levels. There are huge 
disparities among the various RECs in this regard, with the Northern 
African Regional Capability (NARC) being one of the least developed.6 
The development of the AU civilian roster, divided into three main 
categories (post-conflict and reconstruction, mediation and mission 
support) is currently facing numerous challenges; these include the 
weak linkage between trained civilians for deployment on the one 
hand, and their wish/ability/readiness to be deployed on the other.
II. Policies affecting Civilian Capacities in the last three years 
Greater focus on Global South empowerment, security sector reform 
and the impending Post-2015 Development Framework have been 
three of the most significant influences on UN policies in recent years. 
The civilian capacity initiative has undergone a steep learning curve 
while seeking to explore new approaches to the issue of national-owned 
development in post-conflict countries.  This includes experimenting 
with new rostering initiatives such as CAPMATCH, and the challenges 
of deploying government-provided personnel (GPP). These initiatives 
continue to be influenced by ongoing trends such as the recruitment 
of expertise from the Global South, institutional empowerment and 
increased partnerships with regional organizations. 
The passive engagement of the UN in 2014 stands in contrast to the 
frenzied activism of the preceding years. The UN had taken steps to 
improve its support for national capacity development in post-conflict 
countries following the recommendations and principles outlined in 
the 2011 Guehenno or Civilian Capacity Report. This includes pub-
lishing the 2013 United Nations Guidance Note for Effective Use and 
Development of National Capacity in Post-Conflict Contexts, a guideline 
for UN countries teams and missions. Twenty-four of the 47 Security 
Council resolutions adopted in 2013 explicitly mention security sector 
reform in the context of civilian capacity.7 The UN’s focus on furthering 
South–South and triangular cooperation with regional organizations 
and financial institutions could be designed to address an institu-
tional deficit in current UN operations while also expanding the UN’s 
fiscal burden and leadership of such initiatives. In particular there is 
potential for cooperation and leadership from enhanced partnerships 
with regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic 
Community of West African States  (ECOWAS) in the area of security 
sector reform. Member states, among them Chad and Nigeria, have 
emphasized the role such organizations could play in creating regional 
security sector guidelines and encouraging reforms.8 
Implementation of current civilian capacity programs
CAPMATCH was launched in September 2012 as an automated forum to 
match capacity demand and supply to countries in post-conflict or transi-
tion. In fact, 85 percent of CAPMATCH requests have come from UN mis-
sions and department headquarters. CAPMATCH has been able to attract 
experts from the Global South: 69 per cent of the 50 new registrants 
within UN member states.
 
However, concerns first mentioned in 2011 by member states regard-
ing the disconnect between technical capacity tools such as CAP-
MATCH and the limited institutional capacity of the UN to manage such 
resources have remained an obstacle.9 As a pilot system, CAPMATCH 
was labor-intensive. Recruitment teams were forced to negotiate the 
modes of request with the quality of civilian expertise that applied. 
This was further problematized by the ongoing internal issue of mem-
ber states’ national roster and identification system. Furthermore the 
technical reliance of CAPMATCH itself may have acted as an impedi-
ment to recruitment from the Global South especially in countries with 
limited online capacity. In the end, agencies and programs made lim-
ited use of the system, using it only as a supplementary source while 
continuing to rely on existing recruitment structures. Thus, the UN 
Secretary- General has signaled his intention to discard the self-service 
system and instead direct resources to strengthening existing outreach 
programs and systems, such as the Departments of Field Support and 
Peacekeeping Operations and at UN headquarters.10
Government-Provided Personnel (GPP)
Technical assistance remains a critical aspect of support to post-
conflict countries. The deployment of government-provided personnel 
to support institution-building in UN missions, particularly regarding 
the rule of law area, such as police, justice and corrections sectors, has 
been one of the more successful aspects of the civilian capacity ini-
tiative, particularly in relation to South–South cooperation programs. 
Triangular cooperation has also been effective. For example, with the 
support of Sweden, Rwanda has provided specialized capacity in the 
7 SC/11369 United Nations. “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2151 (2014), 
Security Council Underscores Need for National Ownership of Security-Sector 
Reform,” 28 April 2004.  
8 “Fifth Committee Delegates Seek More Clarity on Budget Implications of Build-
ing Institutional Civilian Capacity in Post-Conflict Situations.” 11 March 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gaab4099.doc.htm>.
 9 Keating, P, & Wiharta, S. (2012, September). CIVCAP 2012: Lasting Concrete 
Foundations. NUPI Police Brief. Available at: <http://www.nupi.no/Publikas-
joner/Policy-Briefs/Policy-Briefs>. 
10 SC/11369 United Nations. “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2151 (2014), 
Security Council Underscores Need for National Ownership of Security-Sector 
Reform,” 28 April 2004. 
36 · 2015
area of police management, and administration to Liberia, and in 
particular the Liberian Ministry of Finance.11 The role that emerg-
ing powers can play through these partnerships has also been noted 
through several UN publications12 and some traditional actors with 
the UK, for example, establishing a fund to target emerging powers 
with triangular cooperation projects.13 
However, many of the problems highlighted in previous policy briefs, 
such as the issue of transparent selection, remuneration and jurisdic-
tion, have yet to be fully addressed. Problems remain in the deployment 
of GPP especially regarding the issue of transparency in how such per-
sonnel are selected (identifying and vetting candidates). The risks for 
personnel who participate with any deployment in a post-conflict setting 
continue to pose a challenge. Bunkering of GPP is an endemic problem 
in Afghanistan and Somalia for example. In recent years the targeting 
of UN personnel has directly led to recruitment and human resource 
problems; people are reluctant to apply for deployment, and the risks 
to nationals also weaken contributing states’ willingness to participate. 
Moreover, such attacks on the UN have led to staff leaving missions early, 
as has happened in Mali.14 The quick turnover on UN missions in addi-
tion to continued weak coordination mechanisms often results in failure 
to acknowledge lessons learned, and therefore a loss of institutional 
knowledge and expertise with the departing staff. Possibly reflecting this 
awareness, in his 2014 report the Secretary-General has proposed using 
GPP for more time-limited, specialized functions. However, such func-
tions have yet to be clarified by the Secretary-General. Furthermore, the 
nature of the threat of transnational terrorism means that contributing 
countries may also risk reprisals at home on their own soil.
III. International Policy Initiatives likely to be affected in the 
future 
The dominance of the civilian agenda will continue to be present in the 
United Nations and other regional organizations. That being said, there 
are currently a set of policies and initiatives, which, once completed, 
will affect the civilian capacity agenda.
 
At the end of October 2014, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High 
Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, tasked with undertaking 
a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, 
and the emerging needs of the future. The last review undertaken in 
this respect was the Brahimi Report (2000), which made several recom-
mendations designed to improve the operational and doctrinal aspects 
of peacekeeping. Although it may be premature to predict, the final out-
come – expected to be discussed during the upcoming general debate 
of the UN General Assembly  – will examine the current modalities of 
civilian deployments. It is worth noting that this panel will be the first of 
its kind to examine both peacekeeping operations and special political 
missions, where civilians are assuming a central role.
2015 will also witness the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture. 
Discussions organized so far,15 based on the last ten years of the UN
11 “Peacebuilding Commission Informal meeting of the Organizational Commit-
tee, 9 April 2014: Summary of Discussion.” Available at <www.un.org/en/
peacebuilding/>.
12 UNDP. (2013). Human Development Report, The Rise of the South: Human 
Progress in a Diverse World. UNDEAS. (2013). Global Development Report, A 
Renewed Global Partnership for Development.
13 Shunichior Honda and Mihoko Sakai. (2014, April). Triangular Cooperation 
Mechanisms: A Comparative Study of Germany, Japan and the UK. JICA Re-
search Institute.
14 Mauricio Artiñano, Peter Blair, Nicolas Collin, Beatrice Godefroy, Conor God-
frey, Brieana Marticorena, Daphne McCurdy, Owen McDougall, Steve Ross. 
(2014, April). Adapting and Evolving: The Implications of Transnational Terror-
ism for UN Field Missions. Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Policy Workshop.
15 Based on discussions of November 24 and 25, 2015 held at the CCCPA 
hosted regional workshop on “Regional Aspects of Peacebuilding: Identi-
fying Gaps, Challenges and Opportunities.”
Peacebuilding Commission’s work, have reflected the importance of 
respecting the principle of “ownership” for any civilian post conflict 
support, yet failed to conclude on the exact definition of “ownership”: 
Does it mean only “ownership of the country (national)”? And if so, is 
it determined only by the government in place – or by all stakeholders, 
including political parties and civil society? Or does it mean “regional 
ownership,” taking into consideration the crucial role of neighboring 
countries and regional and sub-regional organizations in succeeding or 
failing a post-recovery phase for a country?
Similarly, the post-2015 development agenda will affect the civilian 
capacity agenda in the future. While the Guéhenno report identi-
fied five key areas of civilian expertise, the post 2015 development 
agenda may switch the focus to other areas. The African Union, in 
its common position adopted in this regard, has already identified 
six main themes: (i) structural economic transformation and inclu-
sive growth; (ii) science, technology and innovation; (iii) people-
centered development; (iv) environmental sustainability, natural 
resources management, and disaster risk management; (v) peace 
and security; and (vi) finance and partnerships.16 
Furthermore, there are currently various initiatives aimed at enhanc-
ing coordination among organizations deploying civilian capacity. 
A lack of coordination results in either a duplicating effort, or, more 
worryingly, an unaddressed domain. Recent meetings held between 
the United Nations, African Union and the Regional Economic Com-
munities in Cairo, November 2014, discussed ways and modalities 
to enhance coordination. 
 
Finally, there remains a legal issue that is likely to affect civilian capaci-
ties. When uniformed peacekeepers are deployed, they have been nomi-
nated by their respective governments. This does not necessarily apply 
for civilians. Both the UN and AU hire most civilians through direct 
recruitment. Recently, several cases of sexual abuses by uniformed 
personnel in peacekeeping missions have been recorded. Both the UN 
and the AU apply a “zero tolerance policy” in this regard, sending back 
the perpetrators of the crimes to their governments for necessary action. 
The case is not clear for the civilians, especially if their recruitment has 
not been made through their respective governments. The outcome of 
this legal debate should constitute an important element affecting the 
civilian capacities in the future.
Conclusions
Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the past 
three years has shown that several problems remain in regard to coordi-
nation and complementarily – sometimes duplication of work – among 
international organizations, regional actors and local stakeholders. In 
particular, coordination issues involve overabundant offers of aid and 
mediation assistance in conflict-affected areas. The goodwill of nations, 
international non-governmental organizations, (INGOs) as well as 
regional actors can prove as detrimental as it can be helpful, especially 
in nascent conflicts. In Ukraine, for example, in the early days of the 
conflict, the office of the interim prime minister was so overwhelmed 
by the torrent of offers of humanitarian and mediation assistance from 
state and non-state actors that he had to turn over coordination to 
the OSCE. Given the enormity and complexity of the conflict, and the 
equally impressive number of agents that wanted to get involved with 
it, the OSCE also found itself incapacitated, and requested assistance 
from the UN regional office. The Ukraine example captures the essence 
of the problem: as long as the coordination issue is unaddressed, coop-
eration between stakeholders will always remain fragile.
16 22nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on 31 January 
2014 declaration.
4Policy Brief
Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading 
independent research institute on international 
politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian 
foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of 
Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless 
operates as an independent, non-political 
instance in all its professional activities. 
Research undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-
term applied research to more long-term basic 
research.
   
   
6 · 2015
6  A seminar held by CCCPA and CMC Finland in October 2014 , attended by rep-
resentatives from the AU, RECs and European Union, tackled this specific issue. 
One of the main recommendations was to appoint, as soon as possible, a civil-
ian roster officer for the NARC region.
7 SC/11369 United Nations. “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2151 (2014), 
Security Council Underscores Need for National Ownership of Security-Sector 
Reform,” 28 April 2004.  
8 “Fifth Committee Delegates Seek More Clarity on Budget Implications of Build-
ing Institutional Civilian Capacity in Post-Conflict Situations.” 11 March 2014. 
Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/gaab4099.doc.htm>.
Complementarity issues, on the other hand, have not diminished 
since the advent of civilian capacity three years ago. In fact, they have 
become more entangled with the entry of regional organizations. As 
reflected most visibly in the area around GPP, personnel deployed to 
conflict zones are ever more disconnected from the local stakehold-
ers and one another. Securitization and bunkering problems are most 
common among GPPs. Recent studies conducted in Afghanistan and 
Somalia has shown this effect.17 In Somalia, both GPPs and INGO 
representatives work almost in isolation. The GPP embedded with 
the UN and other major international organizations are still operating 
largely out of Nairobi or Mogadishu international airport. Similarly in 
Afghanistan, the end of the ISAF mission – and the reduction of troops 
to 12,000 in the Resolute Support Mission – may discourage civilian 
capacity providers from continuing their mission outside the safety 
bubble of the Northern Province. 
Another emerging trend is the widening gap of communication between 
the host government and civilian capacity providers. This has become 
more common between INGOs operating independently. Not only do 
they not coordinate their activities with their peers, but they have lim-
ited relations with the coordination offices in their home countries, as 
well as with the representatives of traditional donors on the ground. 
The third dimension of coordination and complementarity problems 
concerns the recipients of civilian capacity. The problem of identifying 
the right partners in the field and the debate over whether to include 
or exclude belligerent/radical actors from civilian capacity assistance 
continues. In Somalia, some Turkish NGOs have had to engage with al-
Shabaab as a necessity of operating in parts of the country. Similarly, 
in Afghanistan “civil society” is not a neutral actor and includes war-
lords that must be considered in operations if support is to reach local 
populations. Any civilian capacity initiative targeting the Balkh region, 
for example, would require the full consent of the regional strongman 
Atta Mohammad Noor. Noor wields sufficient regional power to tip the 
scale towards stability or chaos. Therefore, engaging a regional enabler 
of his caliber for civilian capacity building in the northern provinces of 
Afghanistan demands a careful predeployment analysis. 
17 E. Fuat Keyman and Onur Sazak. (2014, July). Turkey as a “Humanitarian 
State”.  POMEAS PAPER No.2. Available at: <http://pomeas.org/Home/index.
php/publications/pomeas-papers/419-turkey-as-a-humanitarian-state#sthash.
WqTFLPON.dpuf>. 
 Onur Sazak, Thomas Wheeler, Auveen Woods. (2015). Turkey and Somalia: Mak-
ing aid work for peace. (Working paper). Saferworld and Istanbul Policy Center.
 Do we sit down with Taliban and hear their wishes in Afghanistan, to 
help civilian capacity penetrate certain high-security risk areas? In the 
last three years, these questions have dominated the discourse on the 
effectiveness and breadth of CICVAP operations.
IV. Policy Recommendations
–  Recommendations: UN 
o	 Emerging	powers	such	as	China,	Brazil	and	India	have	a	more	business-oriented	
approach	 to	development	 in	contrast	 to	 the	aid-centric	policies	of	 traditional	
donors.	Further	consultation	and	engagement	with	these	countries	in	the	area	of	
economic	revitalization,	the	weakest	sector	of	civilian	capacity	in	the	UN,	could	
support	more	innovative	approaches.	
o	 To	the	peacekeeping	panel	review:	Address	civilian	capacities	in	a	holistic	approach,	
and	in	a	modality	which	takes	into	consideration	the	perspectives	of	various	regio-
nal	organizations,	new	development	actors,	as	well	as	the	post-2015	development	
agenda	findings	and	the	2015	peacebuilding	review.
o	 Coordination	problems	between	the	UN,	regional	organizations	and	emerging	powers	
should	be	considered	to	avoid	duplication	of	work.	Emerging	powers	such	as	South	
Africa	and	Turkey	have	illustrated	their	willingness	to	participate	in	such	activities.	
As	more	and	more	conflicts	will	require	closer	and	more	comprehensive	regional	
organization	 involvement,	 suitable	coordination	strategies	must	be	developed	 to	
prevent	 overcrowding	of	 civilian	 capacity	 initiatives.	The	 internal	 capacities	 of	
these	states	often	differs	from	that	of	traditional	actors	and	must	be	considered	as	
an	institutional	issue	and	a	not	necessarily	a	reluctance	to	engage.			
–  Recommendations: AU 
o	 Continue	the	documentation	and	dissemination	of	civilian	capacity	initiatives	and	
ensure	a	harmonized	pace	of	advance	within	the	various	sub-regions	in	Africa.
o	 Further	consultations	are	needed	between	the	AU,	RECs,	and	other	countries	on	the	
best	approaches	for	civilian	deployment.
o	 Training	of	civilians	should	be	linked	to	the	creation	of	the	civilian	roster	of	experts.	
– General recommendations for civilian capacities 
o	 Link	the	debates	on	peacekeeping,	peacebuilding	reviews	and	the	post-2015	deve-
lopment	agenda	to	avoid	duplications	and	redundancy	related	to	civilian	capacities.
o	 From	one	side,	complementary	problems	can	be	resolved	through	more	communica-
tion,	not	only	between	the	donor	countries	and	the	major	international	organizations	
but	also	via	an	increased	peer-to-peer	dialogue	among	INGOs	currently	operating	
on	their	own.	However,	donors	must	not	forget	to	consider	the	needs	and	opinions	
of	the	populations	in	recipients	countries	who	often	know	more	about	what	they	
need	and	how.	
o	 Securitization	of	aid	and	the	“bunkering”	of	civilian	capacity	efforts	should	end.	
Emerging	powers	are	generally	opposed	to	these	trends	and	engage	in	alternative	
approaches	to	post-conflict	countries	with	some	such	as	Brazil,	India	and	Turkey	
having	some	success	with	on	the	ground	direct	engagement.	
o Effective targeting of the right partners on the ground should be considered. 
Renewed attention should also be given to appeasing hardliners and including 
potential spoilers in pre-deployment talks. Consideration of who are the “right 
partners” from the perspective of local populations and legitimacy must also 
be included.
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